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THE LAW OF RULES 
Cory J. Marsolek∗ 
“Administrative Law is not for sissies—so you should lean back, clutch the sides of your chairs, and steel 
yourselves for a pretty dull lecture.”1 The essence of this Note is that courts should treat agency rules that 
have “the force and effect of law” the same as statutes when courts determine at what point in time an 
agency rule becomes enforceable. Additionally, is the idea that courts retain the judicial power to inter-
pret the statute.  Only after a court has interpreted the statute does it then determine whether the agency 
action is harmonious with the law. Thus, courts do not abdicate their Article III role when deferring to 
agency rules in the Chevron/Brand X contexts. 
 
The Brand X Problem 
The Court’s landmark holding in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet 
Services2 creates a conundrum in administrative law. To illustrate, consider the following scenario: First, 
the agency takes a position that allows certain litigants to adjust their immigration status. Second, a court 
defers to that agency position. Third, the agency changes its position to no longer allow this particular 
class of litigants to adjust their status. After the agency changes its tune, a litigant within the class, osten-
sibly relying on the court’s precedent, seeks to have their immigration status adjusted. Meanwhile, the 
court in a different case, defers to the agency’s second interpretation. Which interpretation of the statute 
should control the litigant’s ability to adjust their immigration status: the first court precedent, or the se-
cond agency rule? 
 
To illustrate the dilemma with an algebraic flourish: a first-in-time court (T1) is asked to interpret a stat-
ute, finds the statute ambiguous, and interprets the statute to mean A. Subsequently, an agency (T2) with 
the power to promulgate rules under the statute comes along and decides that a better interpretation of the 
statute is B, not A. Finally, a third-in-time court (T3) comes along and defers to the agency’s interpreta-
tion (B) as reasonable. Which interpretation, A or B, should control a litigant who files after T2 but before 
T3? 
 
We know from Brand X that an agency’s reasonable interpretation is controlling even when it conflicts 
with a prior court’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute.3 But the scenario above raises several im-
portant and problematic questions around retroactivity that Brand X does not directly answer. The ques-
                                            
∗ Mitchell Hamline School of Law, J.D., expected 2018. Many thanks to Professor Mehmet Konar-Steenberg for his 
guidance and suggestions; and to the Board of the Journal of Law and Public Policy. All errors are mine.  
 
1 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989). 
 
2 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 
3 Id. at 982-983 (“Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpre-
tation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”). 
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tions that arise are when did the law change, and when are litigants subject to that law? Did the law 
change when the agency changed its interpretation to B, or did it change when the court deferred to the 
agency’s interpretation of B? And who decides? 
 
Two authorities—Guiterrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,4 and Retroactivity Analysis after Brand X5—take the posi-
tion that the agency’s ability to enforce the rule turns on judicial acquiescence to the new rule. Their 
propositions boil down to the idea that an agency in the Brand X context may not apply its rule until after 
a court has deferred to the agency’s new interpretation of the statute under Chevron.6 
 
This Note takes a different position: In the Brand X context, courts should treat agency rules that have 
‘the force and effect of law’7 as essentially that—laws. Because agency rules are essentially laws, when 
agencies change their “interpretation” of a statute—when agencies change their implementation of the 
statute—even that interpretation conflicts with a prior court precedent, courts should analyze the agency’s 
change through a lens similar to the legislature passing a law that overrides a contrary prior court deci-
sion. Thus when the agency promulgates a new rule at T2, this new rule is enforceable until a court strikes 
it down. Therefore, litigants should rely on the agency’s new rule rather than prior court precedent.  
 
When the agency promulgates a rule, the agency is implementing the law pursuant to its statutory and, for 
executive branch agencies, constitutional authority.8 Moreover, agency rules have a similar legal impact 
as statutes, and courts analyze them under comparable rubrics.9  
 
When viewed through the rules-as-laws lens, the Brand X problem is not as problematic. Upon this foun-
dation, agencies do not infringe on the courts province to interpret the law when an agency changes its 
implementation of a statute in a way that is contradicts a court’s prior interpretation. This foundation also 
alleviates the number of hoops that agencies, courts, and litigants must jump through to determine wheth-
er the rule can be applied. Once the rule is promulgated it has “the force and effect of law,” and it is valid 
unless, and until, a court strikes the rule down. 
 
There are serious constitutional separation of powers questions that underlie the Brand X problem. Those 
issues are inherent in the modern administrative state. The modern administrative state hinges on the legal 
fiction that congressional delegation to agencies to promulgate and interpret rules are really agencies exe-
                                            
4 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 
5 James Dawson, Note, YALE J. ON REG. 219 (2014). 
 
6 See, e.g., infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
 
7 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 296 (1979) (“It has been established in a variety of contexts that 
properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the ‘force and effect of law.’”). 
 
8 Cf. Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e will 
defer to an agency's interpretation of the statute it is charged with implementing . . . . When Congress enacts an im-
precise statute that it commits to the implementation of an executive agency, it has no control over that implementa-
tion (except, of course, through further, more precise, legislation).”). 
 
9 See, infra Part III. 
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cuting the law,10 rather than creating the law,11 and/or interpreting the law.12 To solve the Brand X prob-
lem, we must place agency actions, and judicial review of those actions, in the proper constitutional orbit. 
The purpose of this Note, in part, is to reconcile agency action with the separation of powers ratified in 
the Constitution that the framers considered necessary to the continued existence of the republic.13  
 
 
I. RETROACTIVITY IN THE BRAND X CONTEXT. 
 
A. RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS AFTER BRAND X. 
1. Core Position 
The core premise of Retroactivity Analysis after Brand X14 is the agency changes the law when it changes 
its interpretation of a statute.15 However, because courts are the final authority on statutory interpretation, 
the new agency interpretation cannot have legal effect until the court ratifies the agency’s interpretation.16 
From that premise, Retroactivity Analysis takes the position that “when ratifying the agency’s T2 interpre-
tation that the law is B, T3 federal courts should assume that their decisions apply purely prospectively. 
Thus, law A, and not law B, should usually apply to litigants who acted any time between T1 and T3.”17 
That encompasses the time between the agency promulgated the new rule (T2) and when the court ruled 
on the validity of the agency’s new rule (T3).  
 
Retroactivity Analysis argues that when an agency changes its interpretation of a statute the agency is 
changing the law rather than clarifying the law.18 From the premise that the agency’s change in interpreta-
tion changes the law, Retroactivity Analysis takes the position that when Brand X applies, the change in 
the law should not be enforced until a court agrees with the change. That is to say, when an agency 
changes its interpretation of a statute to one that a court previously interpreted differently, the agency 
                                            
10 See U.S. Const. art. II. § 3, cl. 5. 
 
11 See U.S. Const. art. I § 1. 
 
12 See U.S. Const. art. III § 1. 
 
13 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 
14 Dawson, Note, Retroactivity Analysis, supra note 5. 
 




17 Id. at 223.  
 
18 Id at 241-246; See also Nat’l Mining Ass’n v Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 859-860 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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generally should not be able to enforce its change in the law until the court places its imprimatur on the 
agency’s new interpretation.19 
 
2. Presumption against Retroactivity 
Retroactivity Analysis suggests courts begin with a presumption of pure prospectivity.20 Then courts 
should weigh the Chevron Oil21 balancing test to determine whether to apply the rule retroactively.22 To 
make that determination, courts weigh three factors. And if all three factors are met, the rule cannot be 
retroactively applied.23 Thus, there is a presumption against retroactivity, and the rule can only be applied 
retroactively from the time the court rules on it (i.e. between T2 and T3) if the Chevron Oil factors are 
satisfied.  
Retroactivity Analysis goes on to suggest that since the Court rejected a case-by-case inquiry (selective 
prospectivity)24 the Chevron Oil test in the Brand X context would apply to the class of litigants similarly 
situated to the party challenging the retroactive application of the rule.25 Thus, even if the challenging liti-
gant failed to meet the Chevron Oil test, the rule could not be applied retroactively to similarly situated 
parties so long as the class of litigants the particular litigant represents would generally pass the Chevron 
Oil Test.26  
 
B. GUTIERREZ-BRIZUELA V. LYNCH 
 
The most prominent skirmish in the Brand X conflict is Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch.27 In that case the 
Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by then-Judge Gorsuch, ruled that when an agency promulgates a rule that is 
contrary to the controlling law in the circuit, the circuit precedent controls until the agency rule is deemed 
reasonable.28 Therefore, the agency can only apply its new rule to conduct that occurs after the court de-
                                            
19 See Dawson, Note, Retroactivity Analysis, supra note 5, at 254-257. 
 
20 Id. at 254. 
 
21 Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). 
 
22 Dawson, Note, Retroactivity Analysis, supra note 5, at 254. 
 
23 Id. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-107. 
 
24 See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993); James B. Dean Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 
(1991). 
 




27 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 
28 Id. at 1148. 
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fers to the new rule as reasonable.29 The legal saga that lead to Gutierrez-Brizuela borders on epic, so this 
Note will explain it chronologically.  
 
1. Dueling Statutes 
The gravamen of the problem in the Gutierrez-Brizuela line of cases are two provisions of immigration 
law that seem out of tune with one another. The first provision allows the Attorney General to grant law-
ful status to any illegal alien currently present in the United States, who entered the country unlawfully.30 
The second provision provides that aliens unlawfully present a second time, after being removed a first 
time for being unlawfully present, are not eligible for a visa unless they remain outside the United States 
for a period of ten years.31 In plain English, the first provision allows the Attorney General discretion to 
grant lawful status to any illegal alien. But the second provision prohibits the Attorney General from 
granting lawful status to an alien who enters the United States unlawfully a second time, unless that alien 
stays outside the United States for a period of ten years after their first removal.  
2. Padilla-Caldera I 
The Tenth Circuit first addressed these statutes in Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzalez.32 In Padilla-Caldera I the 
court determined the provision granting the Attorney General discretion to grant lawful status to an illegal 
alien prevailed.33 The court utilized the textual canons of statutory construction—that statutes should be 
read in harmony,34 and that a specific statute amends a general statute.35 It is arguable, however, that the 
court ultimately found the statute ambiguous and looked to its purpose.36 
3. In re Briones 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (B.I.A.) subsequently took a different view on the statutory provisions 
at issue. Its decision In re Briones37 held that the two provisions should be read not to afford the Attorney 
                                            
29 Id. at 1144-1145 (“Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for relief during the period after the BIA's announcement of its 
contrary interpretation in Briones yet before Padilla-Caldera II declared Briones controlling and Padilla-Caldera 
I effectively overruled.” (emphasis in original)). 
 
30 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2)(A). 
 
31 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(i)(9)(C)(i)-(ii). 
 
32 426 F.3d 1294, 1298-1301 (10th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Padilla-Caldera I], amended and superseded on reh’g by 
453 F.3d 1237, 1242-1244 (2006) (affirming, in relevant part, the holding of the panel decision). 
 
33 Id. at 1301. 
 
34 Id. at 1298-1299. See also ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS § 39 (2012) (Related-Statutes Canon) [hereinafter Reading Law]. 
 
35 Id. See also SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 34, at § 28 (General/Specific Canon). 
 
36 See Id. at 1299 (“[W]hen, as here, the text itself gives no indication of which provision Congress intended to 
supercede the other, we look to legislative history and the underlying policies of the statutory scheme.”). See also, 
infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 
37 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007). 
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General discretion to grant lawful status to those aliens who otherwise would be unable to receive lawful 
status due to § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i).38 The Board’s decision relied primarily upon on policy concerns.39 While 
it is true that the B.I.A. undertook a statutory construction analysis,40 the Tenth Circuit’s later analysis 
relied upon the B.I.A. decision resting on policy concerns, because those concerns are traditionally en-
trusted to the agency.41 
4. Padilla-Caldera II 
In Padilla-Caldera v. Holder,42 the B.I.A. sought to apply the In re Briones decision to Mr. Padilla-
Caldera of Padilla-Caldera I fame.43 The Tenth Circuit conceded the statute was ambiguous.44 Then de-
termined the B.I.A.’s In re Briones decision was reasonable, and granted the agency Chevron deference 
under the principles of Brand X.45 
5. De Niz Robles 
The next chapter in the B.I.A.-Tenth Circuit Brand X retroactivity odyssey is De Niz Robles v. Lynch.46 
Mr. De Niz Robles filed a petition for adjustment of his immigration after the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
Padilla-Caldera I, and before the B.I.A. decided In re Briones.47 The B.I.A. retroactively applied Briones 
to Mr. De Niz Robles and held that he was categorically ineligible for adjustment of his status.48 The 
Tenth Circuit rejected the B.I.A.’s decision.49  
                                                                                                                                             
 
38 Id. at 370-371. 
 
39 Id. (“[O]ne of the chief purposes of the IIRIRA amendments of 1996 was to overcome the problem of recidivist 
immigration violations . . . .The enactment of these multifarious provisions . . . reflects a clear congressional judg-
ment that such repeat offenses are a matter of special concern . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
40 See Id. at 361-362. 
 
41 See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144 (“[T]he BIA offered its view that—as a matter of policy discretion . . . 
.”). 
 
42 637 F.3d 1140, (10th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Padilla-Caldera II]. 
 
43 Padilla-Caldera I, supra note 32, was remanded to the B.I.A., and during the intervening period the B.I.A. decid-
ed In re Briones. The B.I.A. sought to apply the In re Briones decision to Padilla-Caldera when the B.I.A. heard that 
case on remand. 
 
44 Padilla-Caldera II, supra note 42, at 1147 (“We have already held that the relevant statutory provisions are in 
conflict and that the ‘the text itself gives no indication of which provision Congress intended to supersede the oth-
er.’” (citation omitted)).  
 
45 Id. at 1152-1153. 
 
46 803 F.3d 1165 (2015).  
 




49 Id. at 1180. 
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The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Gorsuch, reasoned that when an agency acts under color of 
Chevron and Brand X (making rules of general applicability that “override” a contrary prior judicial deci-
sion), the agency “comes perhaps as close to exercising legislative power as it might ever get.”50 And 
when the agency acts in a legislative capacity creating a rule of general applicability, there is a presump-
tion of purely prospective application of that rule.51  
 
The court rejected the B.I.A.’s contention that since Briones was a quasi-judicial decision, the B.I.A. 
merely “clarified what the law always meant.”52 The court observed that “substance doesn’t always fol-
low form.”53 The court said that when an agency acts to overturn a prior court precedent by creating a rule 
of general applicability, the agency is exercising its quasi-legislative authority, regardless of the proceed-
ing the agency uses to create the new rule.54 Based on the prospectivity principles of the exercise of legis-
lative authority, the court ruled against the B.I.A.’s retroactive application of Briones to Mr. De Niz Ro-
bles.55 
 
The court also expressed constitutional concerns with the agency’s retroactive application of the Briones 
rule. The court stated that there are Due Process concerns in the retroactive application of rules because it 
penalizes conduct the party had no notice was illegal.56 Retroactivity violates the fundamental “due pro-
cess interests of ‘fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.’”57  
 
The court found Equal Protection concerns in similar interests. The court recognized that “permitting ret-
roactivity would undo settled expectations in favor of a new rule of general applicability rendered by a 
decisionmaker expressly influenced by policy and politics.”58 It allows the party in political power to 
“punish those who have done no more than order their affairs around existing law.”59 And it gives the par-
ty in political power the authority to pick who they want to punish, then create the law to accomplish that 
end, without affording the disfavored party the opportunity to avoid the gallows.60 
                                            




52 Id. at 1172 (quoting In re De Niz Robles, No. A074 577 772, 2014 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 5677 (BIA July 11, 
2014). 
 
53 Id. at 1173. 
 
54 Id. at 1173-1174. 
 
55 Id. at 1180. 
 
56 See Id. at 1168. 
 
57 Id. at 1169 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)).  
 
58 Id. at 1174. 
 
59 Id. at 1174-1175. 
 
60 See Id. (“[Those in power can choose what to punish] with full view of who will stand to flourish or flounder, . . . 
able to single out disfavored persons and groups and punish them for past conduct they cannot now alter.”). 
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The court also added one significant “wrinkle.”61 The court stated that “[a]n agency in the Chevron step 
two/Brand X scenario may enforce its new policy judgment only with judicial approval.”62 The court rea-
soned that when an agency operates in the Brand X context, it is exercising legislative power, not judicial 
power, and is thus subject to a presumption against retroactivity.63 Thus, under Chevron the court must go 
through the Chevron analysis to determine if the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. 
 
6. Gutierrez-Brizuela 
That brings us to Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch.64 Here the B.I.A. sought to apply Briones to a petition filed 
by Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela after the B.I.A. decided Briones, but before the Tenth Circuit deferred to Brio-
nes in Padilla-Caldera II.65 Gutierrez-Brizuela starts with the proposition that Briones did not have legal 
effect in the Tenth Circuit until the court determined its validity under the judicial review umbrella of 
Chevron and Brand X.66 The court reasoned that Padilla-Caldera I was still good law in the Tenth Circuit 
at the time Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela filed his petition because he filed the petition before Padilla-Caldera 
II. Since the court determined that Briones was not the law in the Tenth Circuit until Padilla-Caldera II, 
the court then undertook a Chenery II/Stewart Capital retroactivity analysis to determine that Briones 
should not apply to Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela.67 
 
The court also undertook a significant constitutional analysis in the case. The court outlined several Due 
Process and Equal Protection concerns it saw in what it believed would be a retroactive application of the 
Briones rule. It reinforced “[t]he due process and equal protection concerns that animated our holding in 
De Niz Robles.”68  
                                                                                                                                             
 






64 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 
65 Id. at 1144-1145. 
 
66 Id. at1145 (“Take the rule first. De Niz Robles held that Briones was not legally effective in the Tenth Circuit until 
this court discharged its obligation under Chevron step two and Brand X to determine that the statutory provisions at 
issue were indeed ambiguous.”). 
 
67 Id. at 1144-1149. 
 
68 Id. at 1146.  
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II. THE PROBLEMS WITH RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS AFTER BRAND X AND 
GUTIERREZ-BRIZUELA 
A. PROBLEMS WITH RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS AFTER BRAND X 
1. Problems with Balancing Tests 
i. The Balancing Test 
The Chevron Oil/Beam hybrid balancing test does not remedy the issues Retroactivity After Brand X 
seeks to ameliorate. Balancing tests do not provide bright line rules for litigants to follow. Thus, litigants 
are in no better position to predict whether they will be subject to the retroactive application of the rule 
than they would be in the absence of the hybrid balancing test contemplated by Retroactivity Analysis.69 
Under Retroactivity Analysis’s balancing test, litigants are required to know the court’s old interpretation, 
the agency’s new interpretation, and how the court may apply the Beam balancing test in Brand X cases.  
ii. Clear Statement Rule 
Retroactivity Analysis after Brand X also draws a comparison to the Court’s clear statement rule for retro-
active application.70 The clear statement rule in Bowen is not applicable to the Brand X problem because 
Bowen refers to a rule’s application to activities before the rule came into effect.71 Brand X arises in situa-
tions after the rule that conflicts with a prior interpretation is validly promulgated, but before a court re-
views the new rule’s validity in light of the old interpretation. The rule itself is applied prospectively 
based on when it was promulgated.  
2. The Role of Agencies and the Role of the Courts 
This Note also disagrees with Retroactivity Analysis’s “clarify or change the law” analysis.72 This Note 
reads Retroactivity Analysis to implicitly accept the dissent in Brand X’s characterization that Brand X 
functionally allows agencies to “overrule” prior court precedents, and in doing so agencies unconstitu-
tionally infringe upon the specific separations of power in the constitution.73 And that Retroactivity Anal-
ysis argues that the new T2 rule is presumptively not effective until the court at T3 defers to the agency’s 
T2 rule.74 Thus, the rule’s application is considered retroactive to the litigant between T2 and T3. This 
Note disagrees with that characterization of agency actions. 
                                            
69 Cf. WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST § 17 (2007) (discussing the legal economics of rules versus stand-
ards); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (discussing the benefits of 
bright line legal rules over judicial balancing tests). 
 
70 Dawson, Note, Retroactivity Analysis, supra note 5, at 231-232. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 
204, 288 (1988). 
 
71 See, e.g., Caring Hearts Personal Home Services, Inc. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 2016) (rebuking HHS 
for attempting to apply rules promulgated in 2012 to activity that lawfully took place in 2008). 
 
72 See Dawson, Note, Retroactivity Analysis, supra note 5 at 241-246. 
 
73 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
74 Dawson, Note, Retroactivity Analysis, supra note 5 at 254-257.  
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When the agency changes its rule, the agency changes its implementation of the law. It is not altering the 
fundamental meaning of the law. The statute still says what is says, and the agency’s implementation 
must be consistent with what it says.75 Courts ultimately interpret the law by determining what the law 
says, then apply that meaning to determine whether the agency’s implementation is reasonable within that 
interpretation.76   
 
The proposition that the political branches may functionally “overrule” prior judicial decisions is an un-
remarkable one.77 Congress occasionally passes laws that ostensibly overrule prior court decisions.78 At 
times the Court will implore Congress to take such actions.79 And courts are not required to determine the 
“overruling” law’s validity before it can be enforced.80  
 
If you start from the premise that agency rules with the “force and effect of law” are essentially laws, then 
it is an unremarkable extension of that premise to say that agencies can promulgate rules that contradict 
prior court precedents. And based on the premise, the agency’s change in the rule should be applied in the 
same manner that a legislative change in the law is. That is, the law is valid until a court strikes it down. 
When the agency creates a new rule at T2, the new rule is just that—a new rule—and it is valid unless, 
and until, a court strikes it down.  
 
This Note also disagrees with Retroactivity Analysis’s juxtaposition between the Erie doctrine,81 which 
requires federal courts to defer to authoritative state law,82 and the Chevron doctrine, where federal courts 
are not.83 Retroactivity Analysis states that “under Brand X, a T3 federal court is not obligated to defer to 
the T2 agency interpretation, and may instead reject any agency interpretation it finds unreasonable.”84 
                                            
75 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843. 
 
76 See Id. at 843 n.9. (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction . . . . If a court, employ-
ing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at 
issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”). 
 
77 See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y. & H. Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (holding that the employee numerosity requirement in 
Title VII is not jurisdictional, but Congress is free to change that if it so wishes).  
 
78 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1077, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (amending Title VII 
to include in the definition of “employee” U.S. citizens who work in foreign countries. This law essentially over-
ruled EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) which held that Title VII did not apply in foreign 
countries).  
 
79 See, e.g., Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201-204, 211 (2009) (questioning 
the continued constitutional validity of the Voting Rights Act in light of changed circumstances).  
 
80 Cf., e.g., Gozlon-Peretz v. U.S., 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991) (“It is well established that, absent a clear direction by 
Congress to the contrary, a law takes effect on the date of its enactment.”). 
 
81 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 
82 Dawson, Note, Retroactivity Analysis, supra note 5 at 238-241. 
 
83 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843. 
 
84 Dawson, Note, Retroactivity analysis, supra note 5. at 223 (emphasis in original). 
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While this assertion is theoretically true, it does not reflect the practical realities of Chevron.85 While the 
authority of the agency is more circumscribed than that of the legislature,86 the agency’s powers are, in 
practice, reviewed through a similar judicial lens.87  
 
The point is, the fact that a federal court can strike down a rule does not mean the rule is not valid until 
after a court reviews it. Just as the fact that a federal court can strike down a law does not mean that judi-
cial review of a statute is required before the law can be enforced.  
 
B. PROBLEMS WITH GUTIERREZ-BRIZUELA 
While the result for the litigant in Gutierrez-Brizuela may be admirable, “the fairness of a process must be 
adjudged on the basis of what it permits to happen, not what it produced in a particular case.”88 The prob-
lem with the approach in Gutierrez-Brizeula is that it places agency rules in a sort of legal purgatory. The 
rule is promulgated by the agency, but if the rule contradicts a prior judicial precedent in that circuit the 
rule is not considered lawful—thus cannot be enforced—until after the court grants the rule Chevron def-
erence. The problems in this approach generate far more uncertainty for litigants than the uncertainty Mr. 
Gutierrez-Brizuela faced with the conflicting dispositions of the Tenth Circuit in Padilla-Caldera I and 
the B.I.A. in Briones.  
1. Due Process Concerns in Gutierrez-Brizuela 
Gutierrez-Brizuela expressed Due Process concerns, primarily the lack of fair notice to litigants and the 
ability of the majority to oppress the minority.89 This Note agrees with those concerns. This Note’s disa-
greement is the point in time when retroactivity takes place. To determine when a rule is retroactive, we 
must determine the point in time where the rule becomes enforceable. As this Note illustrates, rules 
should be enforceable at the point they are promulgated.90  
 
That is why this Note takes the position that the concerns that “animated the court’s holding” in 
Gutierrez-Brizuela are inapplicable to these cases. In this Note’s view, the B.I.A.’s Briones rule was valid 
once the B.I.A. handed it down, thus it could be applied to Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela because he did not file 
his petition until after Briones.  
                                            
85 See Barnett & Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, infra note 123. 
 
86 Agencies cannot exceed their authority granted to them by the legislature through their enabling statute, while 
Congress cannot exceed its authority granted to it by the people through the Constitution. Congress’s authority is 
broader, the principles are conceptually similar—each entity’s authority to create rules is granted at the enumerated 
behest of its sovereign superior.  
 
87 See Barnett & Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, infra note 123. 
 
88 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 731 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
89 Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1146.  
 
90 See, infra part III. 
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2. Other Circuits 
Brizuela-Gutierrez is not this issue’s first appearance in the federal circuits. This issue reared its head in 
other circuits. Those circuits took a different approach than the Tenth Circuit. The issue reached the First 
Circuit,91 Third Circuit,92 Fourth Circuit,93 Sixth Circuit,94 Seventh Circuit,95 and Ninth Circuit.96 In each 
of those cases, each court reached the opposite conclusion the Tenth Circuit reached in Brizuela-
Gutierrez. Other recent scholarship is also critical of the Tenth Circuit’s retroactivity approach.97  
3. Forum Shopping 
Gutierrez-Brizuela may create the possibility of forum-shopping. Litigants will pick the circuits whose 
rule favors them. An agency looking to avoid the Gutierrez-Brizuela problem will enforce its rule in one 
of the circuits that decided the question the opposite way. Likewise, challengers who do not want to be 
subject to an agency rule that contradicts a prior judicial precedent will seek to litigate in the Tenth Cir-
cuit. Gutierrez-Brizuela also presents problems in questions it left open. Horizontal applications of court 
interpretations and retroactive rules. Would the Tenth Circuit take the Gutierrez-Brizuela approach to a 
Ninth Circuit precedent?  
 
For example, take a hypothetical where Padilla-Caldera I and II are litigated in the Ninth Circuit, then 
Gutierrez-Brizuela comes to the Tenth Circuit. Would the Tenth Circuit hold that, for the Due Process 
and Equal Protections concerns that “animated its holding,”98 Padilla-Caldera I is persuasive and should 
determine Gutierrez-Brizuela’s outcome because the Ninth Circuit did not hand down Padilla-Caldera II 
before Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela filed his petition? Or would the fact that Ninth Circuit precedent is not 
binding on the Tenth Circuit change the outcome? In the latter case, Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela would be out 
of luck because he filed his petition in the wrong circuit where there was no precedent and thus Brand X 
did not apply, so the new rule simply received Chevron deference. And what do you do when there are 
conflicting rules in the circuits.99 
                                            
91 See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC. v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 16-17, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2006).  
 
92 See United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 314-315 (3rd Cir. 2014). 
 
93 Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 347-349, 352 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 
94 Metropolitan Hospital v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 712 F.3d 248, 255-256 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 
95 Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. V. Burwell, 763 F.3d 754, 758-760 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 
96 Medina-Nunez v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 
97 See Daniel Hemel, The Tenth Circuit vs. Brand X, Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment (Aug. 24, 2016), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-tenth-circuit-vs-brand-x/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017 at 11:56pm). 
 
98 See supra notes 68.  
 
99 See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. 
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Further, what about vertical applications? For example, Supreme Court precedents. It is hornbook law 
that the circuit courts must strictly adhere to Supreme Court precedent.100  If an agency rule contradicts a 
prior Supreme Court precedent, must the agency have that Court say the rule is valid before the agency 
can enforce the rule? These issues may create quite a legal labyrinth. 
 
These questions also present Due Process and Equal Protection concerns of their own. Under the 
Gutierrez-Brizuela regime, the applicability of rules is dependent not only on which circuit the litigant is 
in, but also on whether that circuit has previously spoken on the statute at issue. Consider again the Pa-
dilla-Caldera in the Ninth Circuit hypothetical. In that hypothetical, if Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela litigates in 
the Ninth Circuit, he is free and clear of the Briones rule because of controlling Ninth Circuit precedent. 
Whereas, if he litigates in the Tenth Circuit he is out luck because there is no controlling precedent in the 
Tenth Circuit, thus the agency can enforce the Briones rule against him. His ability to be on notice of 
what the law is depends upon what the agency rule is, what circuit he is in, whether the circuit has spoken 
on the issue, and when the circuit has spoken on that issue.  
 
This problem also creates Equal Protection concerns. Similarly situated litigants under the umbrella of 
federal agency jurisdiction are subject to different agency rules based on what circuit they may find them-
selves in. It is one thing for federal circuits to differ on interpretations of the law, where courts are al-
lowed to experiment with interpretations of a law based on their geographical region.101 It is a different 
matter when federal agency enforcement of a generally applicable rule is subject to manipulation based 
on which circuit a litigant is in. This problem is the type that Chevron and Brand X aimed to avoid.102 
 
C. SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS 
1. Vermont Yankee 
The Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. admon-
ished that “[the APA] established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to 
have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.”103 Gutierrez-Brizuela forces 
agencies to go to court to have their rules validated before the rule can be enforced. This requirement 
sounds strikingly like a court imposed rulemaking procedures that Vermont Yankee admonished as an in-
vasion of the province of the political branches.104 
                                            
100 See BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT § 2 (2016) (detailing how lower courts must 
strictly follow the precedents of higher courts within that jurisdiction). 
 
101 See, e.g., Jennifer K. Luse et al., "Such Inferior Courts...”: Compliance by Circuits with 
Jurisprudential Regimes, 37 AM. POL. RES. 75, 77-78 (2009) (internal citation omitted). 
 
102 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980 (“In Chevron, this Court held that ambiguities in statutes within an agency's juris-
diction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion. Filling 
these gaps, the Court explained, involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than 
courts.”). 
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2. Diffusion of Accountability 
A subtler problem created by Gutierrez-Brizuela is one of accountability. Under the Gutierrez-Brizuela 
regime, whether a rule is enforceable is dependent upon the courts. As evidenced by the sequence of 
events that led up to Gutierrez-Brizuela, this process can take years. In Re Briones was decided in 2007, 
Padilla-Caldera II in 2011, and Gutierrez-Brizuela in 2016. Based on the reasoning in Gutierrez-Brizuela 
it was four-years before the Briones rule could validly be applied in the Tenth Circuit. That is longer than 
a House of Representatives election cycle.105 If a rule is politically problematic, who does the public 
blame? Congress has no idea whether a court will strike down the rule. The Executive does not know 
whether their rule is enforceable. And the courts cannot have a say unless the rule comes to them in the 
form of a case or controversy.106  
 
The issue created here is one of diffusion of power. This diffusion makes it difficult for the people to hold 
the political branches accountable.  This is an example of what Chief Justice Roberts cautioned, that “the 
diffusion of power carries with it the diffusion of accountability.”107 And that “[w]ithout a clear and effec-
tive chain of command, the public cannot determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a perni-
cious measure, or of pernicious measures ought to fall.”108 The clear chain of command should be that the 
rule is valid once it is created, and can be applied unless and until a court says the rule is not reasonable.  
 
III. AGENCY RULES VERSUS STATUTES 
A. STATUTES 
The federal government’s power is limited to those powers specifically enumerated to it under the Consti-
tution.109 Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power to create laws.110 Subject to exceptions 
not relevant here, courts review the constitutionality of statutes for whether there is a rational basis for the 
legislation.111 Under the rational basis standard courts will uphold the law so long as there is a plausible 
justification for the law.112 If there is a plausible justification, then the court’s “inquiry is at an end.”113 
                                                                                                                                             
 
105 U.S. Cont. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
  
106 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See also, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 492-494 (2009) 
(explain how and why the case or controversy requirement is a “fundamental limitation” on judicial power). 
 
107 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010). 
 
108 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).  
 
109 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 33 (1824) (“[T]he constitution of the United States is one of limited and 
expressly delegated powers, which can only be exercised as granted, or in the cases enumerated.”). 
 
110 U.S. Const. art. I § 1. Cf. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § *44-*46. 
 
111 See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073 (2012). 
 
112 Armour, 132 S. Ct. at 2080. 
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B. RULES AND ORDERS 
Agency rules are reviewed under the judicial standard of whether or not the rule is arbitrary and capri-
cious.114 Courts will uphold the agency rule so long as it is reasonable.115 Courts determine reasonableness 
by examining: whether the agency followed the guidelines set forth for agency action in the APA and the 
agency’s enabling statute;116 whether the agency decision reflects the record compiled in the agency pro-
ceeding;117 and whether the agency has given adequate reasons for its decision.118 Generally speaking, 
whether the agency has given adequate reasons requires merely that it considers the relevant factors, and 
that the agency’s path can reasonably be discerned.119 
 
Agency actions under §§ 556 and 557 (such as B.I.A. adjudications) are reviewed under the substantial 
evidence test.120 The test requires a court to uphold an agency decision unless it “cannot conscientiously 
find that the evidence supporting [the agency’s] decision is substantial, when viewing in a light that the 
record entirely furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the [agency’s] view.”121 In practice, 
the substantial evidence operates similarly to (if not more deferential than) the arbitrary and capricious 
test.122 
 
In theory, the standards of review for rules are slightly more stringent than the rational basis test for stat-
utes. The functional difference between legislation being upheld so long as there is some rational basis, 
and agency rules being upheld so long as it is rational and the agency’s path can be reasonably discerned 
operates like an academic one. Recent empirical evidence on judicial deference to agency actions may 
bear that out.123 
                                                                                                                                             
113 F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993). 
 
114 5 U.S.C. § 706; See also, e.g., Citizens of Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-414 (1971) (“[T]he exist-
ence of judicial review is only the start: the standard for review must also be determined. For that we must look to § 
706 of the Administrative Procedure Act.”). 
 
115 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843. 
 
116 See, e.g., Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 
117 See, e.g., O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 508 (1951). 
 




120 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(E). 
 
121 Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1952). 
 
122 See, e.g., Barnett & Walker, Chevron in the Circuits, infra note 123 at 41. 
 
123 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts 115 MICH. L. REV. at 41 (forthcoming 
2017) (finding that when the federal courts of appeals applied Chevron, agencies won 81.8% of the time in cases 
reviewing formal adjudications, and 74.2% of the time in cases reviewing notice and comment rulemaking) [herein-
after Chevron in the Circuits].  
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C. INTERPLAY WITH OTHER AREAS OF THE LAW 
Preliminary Injunctions 
Another area where agency rules are analogous to statutes is the scope of judicial review during the pre-
liminary stages of litigation. Preliminary injunctions enjoin the application of a rule until there is a final 
judicial determination on the merits.124 The party requesting the preliminary injunction must meet a multi-
factor test.125 Preliminary injunctions are used to enjoin statutes.126 They are also used to enjoin agency 
rules.127 If an agency rule that conflicts with a prior judicial interpretation is not enforceable until a court 
agrees with the new rule, then there would be no need for litigants to request a preliminary injunctions 
when challenging that agency rule. That, however, is not the current practice.128 
 
IV. SOLUTIONS 
This Note’s solution is that agency rules with the force and effect of law have the same practical effect as 
statutes, thus one should treat agency rules analogously to statutes for judicial review purposes in the 
Brand X context. When an agency promulgates a new rule that conflicts with a prior court’s precedent, 
the agency rule is enforceable as law until a court strikes the rule down as arbitrary and capricious. 
A. AGENCY RULES AS LAWS 
As noted, rules are essentially statutes, they carry the force and effect of law and should be treated as 
such.129 This bright-line rule cuts down on needless litigation, provides certain to litigants, and keeps 
agencies from expending Treasury funds litigating potential non-issues. When the rule has the force and 
effect of law, the agency can enforce it prospectively from the point the final rule is published. And if the 
rule is ultra vires, it will be struck down by the courts.  
 
If a new rule is of doubtful validity, then the court may grant a preliminary injunction.130 This injunction 
will prohibit enforcement of the rule until there is a judicial determination on the merits.131 It is quite pos-
                                            
124 Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 65(a). See also John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 
(1978) [hereinafter Preliminary Injunctions]. 
 
125 See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
 
126 See Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions supra note 114. 
 
127 See Winter, 555 U.S. 7.  
 
128 See, e.g., TEXO ABC/AGC v. Perez, No. 3:16-CV-1998-L, 2016 U.S. Dist. WL 6947911 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 
2016); Nevada v. United States Department of Labor, No. 4:16-CV-00731, 2016 U.S. Dist. WL 6879615 (E.D. Tex. 
Nov. 11, 2016) (enjoining the D.O.L. final rule that revised 29 C.F.R. Part 541). 
 
129 See, supra Part III. 
 
130 Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 65(a). 
 
131 See, e.g., supra notes 127, 128. 
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sible that a new agency rule that conflicts with an old court precedent would be more susceptible to meet-
ing the elements required for a court to grant a preliminary injunction. 
 
Courts Role under Chevron 
The greater constitutional question is the courts role to interpret the law. The answer here is § 706(2)(A). 
The reviewing court shall decide “all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory pro-
visions, [ ] determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action[,]” and shall “hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be—arbitrary, [and] capricious.”132  
 
This standard is essentially what Chevron asks. Chevron requires a court to determine “whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”133 If Congress has not, then the court determines 
“whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”134 Courts must make 
that determination by “employing traditional tools of statutory construction.”135 What this means is that 
when an agency promulgates a rule, the court first employs the traditional tools of statutory interpretation 
to interpret the statute.136 Then, if the court finds the statute is ambiguous, the court upholds the agency 
interpretation if it is not arbitrary and capricious.137 That means the agency’s interpretation is reasonable 
within the court’s construction of the statute.138 In the Brand X context, if the agency promulgates a rule 
that is contrary to a prior court precedent interpreting the statute, the prior court’s interpretation of the 
statute is part of the arbitrary and capricious analysis.  
 
 
V. COUNTER ARGUMENTS 
A. WHY RULES ARE NOT ANALOGOUS TO STATUTES 
One could argue that rules are not analogous to statutes because statutes are enacted directly pursuant to 
the Constitution.139 It is, however, the role of the judiciary to interpret the law.140 And the judiciary inter-
                                            
132 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 




135 Id. at 843 n.9. 
 
136 Cf. SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 34. 
 
137 See, e.g., Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A. 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442-2446 (2014); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-
983. 
 
138 Id. See also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731-732 (2006) (“The only natural definition of the term 
“waters,” our prior and subsequent judicial constructions of it, clear evidence from other provisions of the statute, 
and this Court's canons of construction all confirm that “the waters of the United States” in § 1362(7) cannot bear 
the expansive meaning that the Corps would give it.”). 
 
139 See U.S. Const. art. I § 1. 
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prets the role of the Executive in executing the law to include agency rules.141 Thus, agency rules are 
promulgated pursuant to the Executive’s constitutional authority to faithfully execute the law.142 That is 
constitutionally similar to statutes created by the legislature pursuant to their constitutional authority.143 
Agencies also are enacting rules pursuant to statutory authority given to them by Congress.144 Thus, agen-
cy action may be the type where Executive power is at its zenith.145 
B. ORIGINALISM 
There are valid originalist arguments against the constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state.146 
this Note, however, does not purport to undertake that analysis and undo the modern governmental struc-
ture. This Note, for the sake of argument, accepts the validity of the modern administrative state. It seeks 
only to reconcile the modern administrative state with the “first principles” of separation of powers147 in 
the context of the retroactive application of administrative rules that have the force and effect of law. This 
reconciliation approach is not without precedent148 among those who eschew the idea of an evolving con-
stitution.149 
C. RELIANCE INTERESTS 
Retroactivity Analysis After Brand X identifies instances where there are significant reliance interests on a 
court’s prior construction of a statute that is “overruled” by an agency.150 In those cases, however, pre-
sumably the agency will have to respond to those interests during the notice and comment period (or in 
the administrative adjudication). The court issue an injunction the litigant can meet the elements. And 
                                                                                                                                             
140 Marbury, 1 Cranch at 177. 
 
141 See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 4 Yale L. J. 126 (2017); 
John B. Olverson Jr., Legislation by Administrative Agencies, 29 Geo. L. J., 637-638 (1941). 
 
142 See Utility Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014) (“Under our system of government, Congress 
makes laws and the President, acting at times through agencies like EPA, ‘faithfully execute[s]’ them. . . . The pow-
er of executing the laws necessarily includes both authority and responsibility to resolve some questions left open by 
Congress that arise during the law's administration.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 
143 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. 
 
144 See Louisiana Public Service Comm’n v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n 
agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). 
 
145 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 (1952) (J. Jackson, concurring). 
 
146 See, e.g., Dep’t of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240-1253 (Thomas, J. con-
curring in judgment) (outlining the originalist position on the “delegation” of power between the branches); See also 
PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014). 
 
147 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
 
148 See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee and Tuan N. Samahon, William Rehnquist, The Separation of Powers, and the Riddle of 
the Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1735 (2006). 
 
149 Cf. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).  
 
150 Dawson, Note, Retroactivity Analysis, supra note 5, at 222-223. 
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during the merits stage of the litigation those reliance interests can be part of the arbitrary and capricious 
analysis.151 
 
Further, if litigants want to prevent getting caught in the crossfire of an interpretive tug-of-war between 
the agency and the court, the Retroactivity Analysis After Brand X and Gutierrez-Brizuela proposals offer 
no clean solutions. Under the Retroactivity Analysis approach, the litigant must decipher how the court 
would apply the Chevron Oil/Beam hybrid test to avoid retroactive application of the rule. Under 
Gutierrez-Brizuela the litigant must be aware of what the new agency rule is, what circuit they are in, 
whether that circuit has spoken on the issue, when the circuit has spoken on the issue, and how the circuit 
might weigh the Chenery II/Stewart Capital retroactivity factors. Under their proposals, the litigant would 
need to know not only what is in the federal register, but also what is in the federal reporter. That takes 
Justice Jackson’s rebuke of implied knowledge of the federal register and multiplies it.152 In contrast, un-
der this Note’s approach the rule is enforceable as soon as it is promulgated, and the litigant need only to 
look to the agency for guidance, or argue to a court that the rule is invalid.   
 
CONCLUSION 
This Note takes the position that agency rules that have the force and effect of law should be considered 
laws for the point in time they become enforceable. Agency rules with the “force and effect of law” are 
essentially laws, and that agencies can promulgate rules that contradict prior court interpretations of am-
biguous statutes. And the agency’s change in the rule should be applied in the same manner that a legisla-
tive change in the law is. That is, the law is valid until a court strikes it down as ultra vires. When the 
agency creates a new rule at T2, the new rule is just that—a new rule—and it is valid unless, and until, a 
court strikes it down.  
                                            
151 Notwithstanding the Court’s repudiation of reliance interests in the interpretive rule context. See Mortgage Bank-
ers Association v. Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 
 
152 See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 387 (1947) (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
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